Welfare Policy and the Distribution of Hours of Work

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Abstract

We examine the distribution of hours of work across industrial sectors in OECD countries. We find large disparities across three sector groups, one that produces goods without home substitutes, and two others that have home substitutes but treated differently by welfare policy. We attribute the disparities to the countries’ tax and subsidy policies. High taxation substantially reduces hours in sectors that have close home substitutes but less so in other sectors. Subsidies increase hours in the subsidized sectors that have home substitutes. We compute these policy effects for nineteen OECD countries.

Keywords. multisector model, employment shares, home production, tax wedge, social subsidies

JEL classifications. E20, H53, J22

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Table 1:
Percentage Distribution of Hours of Market Work in Three Countries
(average, 1994-2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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The full definition of sectors is given in Table 3. Sector 1 is mainly manufacturing and business services, sector 2 is health and social work and sector 3 is mainly unskilled or semi-skilled services. Government administration and education are excluded.

There are large differences in the kind of jobs that people do across the industrial countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). To illustrate the point, we report in Table 1 the percentage distribution of hours of work in three countries with different social support programs, the United States, Japan and Sweden. Hours of work are sorted into three groups, according to whether or not the output of an industry has close substitutes in home production. Sector 1 comprises agriculture, manufacturing, business services and other services of a specialized nature, which are activities that have no counterpart in home production, as reported in time use surveys. Sector 2 is the health and social work sector, which has home counterparts, especially in family care. Sector 3 consists of all other sectors, which produce less specialized services and which also have close substitutes in home production, such as retailing (a substitute for shopping time) and catering (a substitute for cooking time).

The share of sector 1 is very similar across the three countries, taking up about 63% of market work. In contrast, there are large differences in the shares of the other two sectors. Sweden has a relatively larger health and social work sector, whereas Japan has the largest share in sector 3, exceeding the Swedish share of this sector by ten percentage points. Why these large differences in the distribution of work?

We argue that the key reason for these large differences in allocations is policy associated with the welfare state. Taxes and subsidies influence allocations along two dimensions. Consumers switch from taxed goods to subsidized ones and from buying services in the market to self-help at home.

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1Our aggregate is economy-wide hours of work excluding public administration, defense and education. A discussion of the data for all the countries, including social support programs and their differences, is contained in the main body of the paper. For more information on social programs see Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999).
We document tax and subsidy data for 19 OECD countries and show that all countries subsidize health and social work, but Sweden and other Scandinavian countries subsidize them much more than other countries do. The tax differentials between social work on the one hand, and all other economic activity on the other, vary a lot across countries, and this explains some of the sectoral differences across countries through the substitution from other market-produced goods into health and social care services.

We find, however, that quantitatively the policy impact on the cross-market substitutions is not big enough to explain the large differences in allocations of the kind shown in Table 1. For example, when an accountant’s services are taxed and a childminder’s services subsidized, a family may hire an accountant for fewer hours and take the child to a childcare center, but the elasticity of substitution between the services of an accountant and the services of a childminder is not large enough to support the required quantitative impact. Moreover, since there are no tax distortions between sectors 1 and 3, cross-market substitutions cannot explain the asymmetries shown in Table 1.

In order to explain the big quantitative impact of tax-subsidy programs and the asymmetric response of different sectors, we need the second reason for the distortionary effects of policy, which works even when taxation is uniform across the economy: the substitution between market and home production. When market goods and services are taxed, households turn to producing some of those goods in the home, where work is untaxed. Similarly, when market-provided social care is subsidized, less of it is done at home and there is more take-up of social services in the market. Because the elasticity of substitution is high between market goods and home production, taxation has a big quantitative impact; and because this elasticity is not the same across all goods, the impact is not uniform across all sectors of market activity. The differential substitutions between market and home production, when combined with the differential tax treatment of social work, drive our results.

We are not the first ones to study the impact of taxes and subsidies and market-home substitutions on market economic activity. But we believe that we are the first ones to study the differential impact of non-uniform net taxes across sectors and derive the impact on the equilibrium distribution of market work. At the micro level, Freeman and Schettkat (2005) study time use data for a small number of countries and conclude that there is virtually one-for-one substitution between home and market work across individuals, a claim that was partially supported by Burda, Hamermesh and Weil (2008). Our results require substantial market-home substitutions at the micro level and they are consistent with one-for-one substitutions for some goods. Also at the micro level, although emphasizing sectoral differences, Davis and Hen-
rekson (2005) study questions similar to ours in a partial equilibrium task-assignment model. They estimate the impact of taxation on employment in three sectors of economic activity, eating and drinking establishments, lodging and retail trade. Their estimation results are consistent with the results of our model.

The macro literature has focused on total hours of work, a topic that we do not address. A main motivation for the macro literature is the reconciliation of high taxation with high participation in Scandinavian countries, which goes against the predictions of Prescott’s (2004) influential study. The reason explored in the literature is that large parts of the tax revenue is returned to consumers conditional on market work, and not in lump sum fashion as assumed by Prescott. Kelly Ragan (2006) calculates a net tax for the whole economy and studies its implications for the choice between home and market work. She makes use of time use surveys and focuses on a small sample of countries, using a variant of the model of Rosen (1997). Total hours of work (in Sweden and how they compare with the United States) is also the focus of studies by Rogerson (2007) and Olovsson (2009), where again the emphasis is in offsetting some of Sweden’s high tax by computing the subsidy to market work at the aggregate level. Although these papers emphasize the market-home substitution, as we do, they calculate a single net tax for the aggregate economy, so they cannot address the question of the distribution of hours across sectors, as we do here.

A paper that follows a methodology that is closer to ours is Rogerson (2008). He shows that the gap in total hours of work between the United States and an aggregate of five continental European countries is due to differences in the size of the service sector. His focus is the dynamic evolution of total hours of work in services since 1950, comparing net taxes in “Europe” and the United States, then and now. In this paper we do not aggregate all service activities together, because some are treated differently by tax-subsidy programs and some do not have home-production substitutes. Our focus is the distortion caused by these differential taxes within the service sector. We construct tax-subsidy rates for each and every one of our nineteen countries, distinguish between three types of service activities and look at the distribution of hours across these activities.

They deliberately omit childcare because of difficulties in constructing comparable subsidy rates across the countries in their sample, one of the challenges that we take up in this paper. Their sample of countries for the employment regressions varies between 9 and 14 countries, depending on data availability.

Our model has the smallest number of sectors needed to capture the distortionary impact of uniform taxation and targeted subsidies. As in the example of Table 1, we distinguish between three market sectors. One that includes all sectors that produce output that has no close home substitutes; one with health and social work that has close home substitutes and is subsidized; and one that includes all other sectors that have close home substitutes and are not subsidized (a full listing of two-digit sectors is given later in this paper, in Table 3). Corresponding to the three market sectors, and given the assumptions that we are making, there are two types of home-produced goods, which we also call sectors for easier reference. One home sector produces goods that are close substitutes to health and social work (mostly childcare) and the other produces goods that are close substitutes to all other services.

Our model has simple linear production functions with no capital, which we believe is a useful restriction for the points that we want to make. The key to the model are two elasticities of substitution, the one between market goods and the one between market and home production. We show that general taxation has a greater impact on sector 3 than on sector 1, because sector 3 loses more hours to the untaxed home sector. But sector 2 is subsidized, so market hours gain both from the home sector (if the subsidy is large enough to outweigh the impact of the income tax) and from the other two non-subsidized sectors.

In order to quantify our predictions we need three different types of data. First, we need to know the hours of work allocated to different sectors, which are available for a fairly large number of countries at the two-digit level through the database *Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach* (EU KLEMS). Second, we need the size of social expenditure on benefits in kind, such as day care centers, which can be obtained from the OECD *Social Expenditure Database* (SOCX). Finally, we need to know the hours allocated to different activities at home, which we obtain from time use surveys. We constructed comparable data sets for 19 OECD countries and we focus on cross-country differences around the time of the time use surveys, circa 2000. These countries include several European countries.

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4Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish between high-skill health care, e.g., hospital treatment, and social work, such as childcare centers or elderly care. Ideally, our sector 2 should exclude high-skill health care which has no home substitutes.

5In Ngai and Pissarides (2008) we discuss in detail the kind of activities spent in home production and review their historical development. The sector allocations that we are adopting here are consistent with that evidence. See also Robinson and Godbey (1997) for the US and Burda, Hamermesh and Weil (2008) for cross-country comparisons.

6See the Appendix for a full listing of data sources and definitions.
from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea, so we have a good mix of welfare states and policy regimes.

Section 1 describes our model of three market and two home sectors. We derive equilibrium allocations as functions of three sets of parameters, preferences, technology and policy. In section 2 we describe the relevant data for the 19 countries in our sample and summarize their main features. In section 3 we give the parameter values used in the quantitative evaluation of the impact of policy. The quantitative evaluation begins with section 4, where we illustrate the workings of the model within the policy parameter range calculated in the data section, and refer back to the example of Table 1. Predictions with the full sample are given in sections 5, 6 and 7, beginning with cross-market substitutions and following up with substitutions between market and home production.

1 The model

Consumer allocations. We solve the time allocations for a representative agent who has a static CES utility function defined over consumption goods produced at home and in the market, and over leisure. She is a price and wage taker in the market, conditional on taxes and transfers chosen by the government, and chooses home production conditional on linear production functions. There is no capital in the model so it can be solved as a static resource allocation problem, with linear production functions for market goods as well and market clearing throughout. There are no profits in equilibrium and all income is in the form of wages. The government balances its budget with lump-sum transfers.

The representative agent’s utility function is

$$U(c, l_m, l_h) = \ln c + v(1 - l_m - l_h),$$

where $c$ is a consumption aggregate, $l_m$ is market work (private and government), and $l_h$ is home work. $v(.)$ is an increasing concave function. Aggregate consumption is a CES aggregate of three types of goods, denoted by $\tilde{c}_i$,

$$c = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{3} \omega_i \tilde{c}_i^{(\varepsilon-1)/\varepsilon} \right]^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)},$$

where $\varepsilon \geq 0$ is the constant elasticity of substitution and $\omega_i > 0$, $\sum \omega_i = 1$. Each $\tilde{c}_i$ is a composite of market-produced and home-produced goods in sector $i$. Sector 1 is comprised of all goods that have no home-produced
substitutes, so $\tilde{c}_1$ is the market good $c_1$. In sectors 2 and 3, $\tilde{c}_i$ is a CES aggregate of market and home produced goods,

$$\tilde{c}_i = \left[ \psi_i c_i^{(\sigma_i - 1)/\sigma_i} + (1 - \psi_i) c_{ih}^{(\sigma_i - 1)/\sigma_i} \right]^{\sigma_i / (\sigma_i - 1)} \quad i = 2, 3,$$

(3)

where $c_i$ is market-produced consumption, $c_{ih}$ is consumption of goods produced at home, $\sigma_i \geq 0$ is the elasticity of substitution between home and market consumption for each good $i$ and $\psi_i \in (0, 1)$.

Government taxes wage income at rate $\tau$, and each market good at a net rate $t_i$ (the gross tax rate less any subsidy). It also taxes or subsidizes employment, at a rate $t_e$. It uses its net revenue from the taxes and subsidies to employ labor and supply goods to consumers. We assume that the product of public administration is a public good that is separable from the goods included in the aggregate $c$. We also exclude from $c$ education services, because they are not a final consumption good but an investment good. The employment used to produce the public good and education is part of $l_m$.

We do include in $c$ health and social care. This is because our focus is on social care, which is clearly a consumption good that can be produced both at home and in the market. The amount of health services consumed by the representative agent is also a matter of consumption decisions, depending on the cost to the individual. Health and social care are subsidized by the government, either directly through the provision of subsidized care or through transfers. We treat the subsidy as a negative tax, with the individual having free choice over the quantity that she consumes at the subsidized price.

Governments also make lump-sum transfers $T$ to the representative agent, which are a component of their social policy and include an item for balancing the budget. The assumptions made about the substitution possibilities between government-supplied goods and goods bought privately influence the size of the implicit lump-sum transfer from the government to the representative agent. The lump-sum transfer plays a critical role in studies of the impact of taxation on total hours of work, such as that of Prescott (2004) and its offshoots. It plays no role in our study of the percentage distribution of work, so we do not need to be explicit about its magnitude.

The disutility from work is independent of sector or location and there is perfect labor mobility. The wage rate is the same in all sectors, so the budget constraint on the consumption of market goods is,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{3} (1 + t_i)p_i c_i \leq (1 - \tau)w l_m + T.$$ 

(4)

The consumption of home goods is constrained by the linear production functions,

$$c_{jh} \leq A_{jh} l_{jh}, \quad j = 2, 3,$$

(5)
where $l_{jh}$ is the time allocated at home to each activity $j$ and $A_{jh}$ is labor productivity in each activity.

In order to solve the problem it is convenient to define a new budget constraint for total work $l \equiv l_m + l_h$, that incorporates the production constraints (5). Define “total” after-tax income by 

$$ (1-\tau)wl, $$

and re-write (4) as

$$ \sum_{i=1}^{3} (1 + t_i)p_i c_i \leq (1 - \tau)wl - (1 - \tau)w(l_{2h} + l_{3h}) + T. $$

(6)

Next, substitute $l_{jh}$ from (5) into (6), to obtain,

$$ \sum_{i=1}^{3} (1 + t_i)p_i c_i + \sum_{j=2}^{3} p_{jh}c_{jh} \leq (1 - \tau)wl + T, $$

(7)

where $p_{jh} \equiv (1-\tau)w/A_{jh}$ is a net implicit (producer) price for home-produced goods. The numerator is the net wage that the household could get by supplying one unit of labor to the market, and the denominator is the number of units of the home good that she could get by supplying the same unit to home production.

The consumer problem is the maximization of (1)-(3) subject to the single constraint (7). From the optimality conditions we derive some key results, focusing our discussion only on the results that have a direct bearing on the distribution of market work.

**Market shares.** We make predictions about the distribution of market work by computing the market share of each sector, defined by $s_j = \frac{l_j}{\sum_{i=1}^{3} l_i}$. Given the structure of the model, it is convenient to derive these predictions from the model’s predictions of the ratios $l_2/l_1$ and $l_3/l_1$, by re-writing the shares as:

$$ s_j = 100 \frac{l_j/l_1}{\sum_{i=1}^{3} l_i/l_1} \quad j = 1, 2, 3 $$

(8)

To make these predictions we therefore need to derive expressions for just two ratios of hours of work, $l_2/l_1$ and $l_3/l_1$. We do this in three steps.

**Marketization.** The composite good $\tilde{c}_j$ can be acquired by buying some $c_j$ from the market at price $(1 + t_j)p_j$, or by producing it at home as $c_{jh}$ at a (shadow) unit cost $p_{jh}$. We define “marketization” as the substitution of one unit of $c_j$ for $c_{jh}$. The extent of marketization is obtained by setting the marginal rate of substitution across goods $c_j$ and $c_{jh}$ equal to their relative prices:

$$ \frac{c_j}{c_{jh}} = \left( \frac{\psi_j}{1 - \psi_j (1 + t_j) p_j} \right)^{\sigma_j} \quad j = 2, 3. $$

(9)
Recalling that \( p_{jh} = (1 - \tau) w / A_{jh} \), it follows that consumers marketize more of good \( j \) if they have higher net wages, if the market good is cheaper or if labor productivity in home production is lower. The impact of these parameters depends on the elasticity of substitution between market and home goods. In the limit, as \( \sigma_j \to 0 \), the two types of goods are consumed in fixed proportions. But for \( \sigma_j > 0 \) there can be a lot of differences in the marketization of home production across individuals, countries or over time, depending on the values taken by taxes and market prices.

**Relative demand for market goods.** We next solve for the ratio of real demand for market goods 2 and 3, which have home substitutes, to the demand for good 1. The objective is to obtain from these ratios the employment shares in each sector of market activity. Setting the marginal rate of substitution across good \( j \) and good 1 equal to their relative price, we obtain,

\[
\frac{c_j}{c_1} = \left( \frac{\omega_j \psi_j}{\omega_1} \right)^\varepsilon \left( \frac{(1 + t_j)p_j}{(1 + t_1)p_1} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \left( \frac{c_j}{\tilde{c}_j} \right)^{1-\varepsilon/\sigma_j}, \tag{10}
\]

We note that \( \frac{c_j}{\tilde{c}_j} \) is the share of good \( j \) that is marketized. It follows that the relative market demand for good \( j \) is a decreasing function of its relative consumer price and, under the plausible restriction \( \varepsilon \leq \sigma_j \), an increasing function of the degree of its marketization. Marketization is an important channel through which policy influences relative market shares. Higher and uniform taxes on all goods (i.e., \( t_j = t_1 \)) do not affect relative consumption shares for given marketization, but they imply less marketization for good \( j \) and so a lower market share for this good, relative to the market share of good 1.

**The sectoral allocation of time.** In order to derive the market employment shares we make use of market clearing and the production functions for each market good. Let the production functions be

\[
c_i \leq A_i l_i, \quad i = 1, 2, 3. \tag{11}
\]

The notation parallels that for home production, with \( A_i \) standing for the (market) labor productivity of good \( i \) and \( l_i \) for the number of hours allocated to it.

The net revenue to the firm from the sale of good \( i \) is \( p_i A_i l_i \), and is used to pay for wages and employment taxes net of subsidies. Free mobility of labor implies that wages are the same in all market sectors, so if employment taxes are also the same across sectors, relative producer prices are given by the ratio of the technology parameters:

\[
(1 + t_e) w l_i = p_i A_i l_i \implies \frac{p_i}{p_j} = \frac{A_j}{A_i}, \quad i, j = 1, 2, 3. \tag{12}
\]
The relative price of the market good to the implicit price of the home good is also obtained from (12), by substituting $w$ from it into the condition $p_{jh} = (1 - \tau)w/A_{jh}$. This substitution yields,

$$
\frac{(1 + t_j)p_j}{p_{jh}} = \frac{(1 + t_j)(1 + t_e)A_{jh}}{(1 - \tau)A_j}.
$$

We define the “tax wedge” that applies to sector $j$, denoted $t_{wj}$, by\footnote{For small tax rates this is approximately equal to the tax wedge used in econometric studies, $t_{wj} = \tau + t_j + t_e$, but taxes in our sample of countries are not small and the approximation is not good.}

$$
t_{wj} = 1 - \frac{1 - \tau}{(1 + t_j)(1 + t_e)}.
$$

Given now the linear production functions, the marketization condition (9) translates into the following condition for the marketization of time in sector $j$:

$$
\frac{l_j}{l_{jh}} = \left(\frac{1}{\psi_j} - 1\right)^{-\sigma_j} \left(\frac{A_j}{A_{jh}}\right)^{\sigma_j - 1}(1 - t_{wj})^{\sigma_j} \quad j = 2, 3.
$$

The marketization of time is driven by three sets of parameters, preferences, productivity, and taxes. For $\sigma_j > 1$, more is marketized when market productivity is higher than home productivity.\footnote{To see the intuition, suppose the goods are perfect substitutes, then $\sigma_j \rightarrow \infty$ and all production moves to the more productive location. If $\sigma_j = 0$ the same quantity of each good needs to be produced and consumed, and so more labor is employed in the less productive location to compensate for the higher productivity in the other location.} More importantly for our present objectives, the impact of policy is summarized in a single composite, the tax wedge. Higher tax wedge leads to less marketization and the impact is bigger when the elasticity $\sigma_j$ is bigger.

Turning now to market sectors, we derive the employment ratios of sectors from (10) and the linear production functions:

$$
\frac{l_j}{l_1} = \left(\frac{\omega_j \psi_j}{\omega_1}\right)^{\varepsilon} \left(\frac{A_1}{A_j}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} (1 + t_j)^{-\varepsilon} \left(\frac{c_j}{c_1}\right)^{1-\varepsilon/\sigma_j}.
$$
Calculating $c_j/\hat{c}_j$ from (3), (9) and (15), we obtain

$$\frac{c_j}{\hat{c}_j} = \psi_j^{-\sigma_j/\sigma_j-1} \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{\psi_j} - 1 \right)^{\sigma_j} \left( \frac{A_{jh}}{A_j(1-t_{wj})} \right)^{\sigma_j-1} \right]^{-\sigma_j/\sigma_j-1}. \quad (18)$$

(17) is a key equation for the model because it gives the dependence of market sectors on policy. For given taxes and subsidies, employment shares are driven by technology and preferences. Under the plausible restriction $\varepsilon < 1$, the less productive sectors attract relatively bigger shares. Policy influences employment shares in two ways. If two sectors are equally taxed ($t_j = t_1$), policy influences their relative size only because of the substitutions between home and market production. In a general equilibrium there is a switch of hours of work from the taxed market sector to the untaxed home sector that produces close substitutes. Sectors with closer home substitutes suffer bigger losses of demand and employment than sectors with less good home substitutes. From (17) it is clear that the condition for this intuition to go through is $\varepsilon/\sigma_j < 1$, that is, that the elasticity of substitution between home and market goods should be bigger than the elasticity of substitution across market goods.

A second impact of policy on market shares is due to non-uniform taxation, because of social subsidies. If $t_j < t_1$, as would be the case if sector $j$ is subsidized and sector 1 is not, the relative employment of sector $j$ for given marketization is higher because of a switch of demand from the taxed sector to the subsidized one. The extent of this switch depends on the elasticity of substitution across market goods, $\varepsilon$.

The model makes strong predictions about two features of sectoral allocations that can be confronted with data. First, the relative employment shares in (17) depend on expenditure tax differentials and on market-home substitutions. Second, the marketization in (16) depends on the tax wedge applying to the sector. We now discuss the data needed to quantify these two predictions.

## 2 Data derivation and description

Time use surveys have proliferated recently but with very minor exceptions they are still mainly one-off surveys that follow similar principles across countries and over time. The United States began an annual survey in 2003 and the European Union is in the process of setting up Europe-wide standards for regular surveys across the European Union. However, for the purposes of this study we are restricted to a small number of surveys; we selected one
survey for as many countries of the OECD as we could find, undertaken as close to the turn of the millennium as possible. For most countries this was the only available information.

Time use surveys record “market work” as the aggregate of the number of hours spent at the place of work, time taken to travel to work and any other activities related to market work, such as working at home in evenings or weekends, job search, reading literature connected with the job etc. For this reason market work reported in time use surveys exceeds hours of work reported in household or employer surveys. In the countries of our sample the average difference between market work reported in time use surveys and the total hours reported by employers over a comparable period of time (and including government employment and education) is 27%, with standard deviation 13%. Table 2 shows the percentage distribution of total hours of work between market and home, making use of the same source, time use surveys. The table shows wide variations across countries, with the central and southern European countries having the smallest percentages of market hours and the two Asian countries the largest market shares.\(^9\)

Time use surveys, however, despite very detailed reporting of the kind of activities done away from the market, do not report the industrial breakdown of market hours. The source of the industrial breakdown of hours of work that is comparable across countries is the EU KLEMS database, which is employer-based. We use this survey to get the percentage distribution of total market hours across the model’s three sectors. The absolute number of hours is needed only in the marketization equations of sectors 2 and 3, the ratio of market hours to home hours. We computed two series for this ratio, one where we obtained the market hours from EU KLEMS and the other where we used the EU KLEMS weight on a sector to compute from the time use surveys its corresponding market hours. The latter procedure, which is the only one available with the data at our disposal, has the advantage that both sets of hours come from the same source. But it assumes that commuting and home preparation related to one’s job is the same across all sectors of economic activity. As this is not likely to be the case (for example, we expect more time spent at home preparing for work by professional people than by workers in unskilled services) we place more confidence in the first of our two marketization series, the one that uses the employer survey for market hours, and this is the one that we use in the computations reported.

\(^9\)The ranking of countries is roughly the same if market hours are measured by EU KLEMS and other employer-based surveys. The only noteworthy difference is that Scandinavian countries report more market-related work at home than the other countries in the sample. The correlation coefficient between the market share reported in Table 2 and the one obtained from KLEMS is 0.9.
Table 2:
The percentage distribution of total hours of work between market and home

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<tr>
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</table>

Both market and home hours are from time use surveys, one for each country, taken around 2000. See the Appendix for more details.

Results, however, are very similar with the two series, which is not surprising given the high correlation between the two marketization series. The correlation between the marketization in sector 2 computed with EU KLEMS data and the one computed with time use data is 0.98, and the same correlation for sector 3 is 0.94.

EU KLEMS gives hours of work for two-digit sectors with very few gaps for most countries, and covers all countries in the sample except for Canada, Norway, and New Zealand, for which we used other sources. We grouped the two-digit sectors into the model’s three sectors according to the classifications in Table 3. The market activities in the sub-sectors included in sector 3 broadly correspond to the home-production activities reported in time use surveys, e.g., hours of work in the retail sector correspond to time spent shopping in time use surveys, restaurants match time spent cooking, etc.

Another problem with the series that uses the time use survey for market hours is that measurement errors lead to higher negative correlations between market hours and home hours. For example, if commuting time for work is misclassified as commuting time for home production, reported home production time rises and market hours fall. But if we use an employer base for market hours, the misreporting of home hours does not impact on the reporting of market hours. We put the model through a more stringent test by taking market hours and home hours from different sources. (Confirming this, results are very slightly better with the marketization data computed from the time use surveys.)
For sector 2, all time use surveys report hours of childcare, which is a close substitute for market-based childcare, and most also report a smaller number of hours for care of other dependents. We were able to construct for all countries an estimate of total care done at home, including child and adult care. The equivalent market sector is health and social work, which includes the number of hours worked in child care centres, adult homes and public and private hospitals. Given that time use surveys do not report time allocated to medical care in the home, ideally we would have wanted to split the market sector into two, one for health services such as hospital treatment, which has no home substitutes, and one for caring services, with home substitutes. However, this is not possible with the available data sets, so we treat the aggregate of health and social work as the market activity, with childcare and adult household care as its close home substitute. The overall figure for adult care is small, amounting to 16% on average in our sample, and mostly done by older age groups (over 65s), so our home production time for care is dominated by childcare, which is accurately measured and reported separately in all time use surveys (see the Appendix for more details).

Government employment and education are excluded from the analysis.\(^\text{11}\) Our aggregate economy is made up of the sectors listed in Table 3 and we study the determinants of the distribution of work among the three sectors of this economy.

\(^\text{11}\)One could argue that medical treatment should be excluded too, as it has many common features with education (government support, investment in human capital, etc.). But this is not possible with the data at our disposal.
The average shares of each of our three sectors for the last ten years of the sample are shown in Figure 1. Sector 1 is the biggest sector in all countries, but the most interesting fact that emerges from this figure is that despite its size, the cross-sectional variation in the share of sector 1 is less than that in the other sectors. This is consistent with our model, to the extent that the two asymmetric influences on hours of market work, the subsidization of some activities and the market-home production substitution, impact directly on the other two sectors.

The largest shares of sector 2 hours are in the four Scandinavian countries, and the smallest in the two Mediterranean and two Asian countries covered by the sample. Although naturally no country is exactly the same as another in its treatment of welfare, there are country clusters with broadly similar policies that correspond to the rankings in Figure 1 (see Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). The Scandinavian countries have the highest levels of overall taxation but they use a large part of the revenue to subsidize market-based social services. They have the largest sector 2 share. Next come the continental European countries, which also have high taxation and subsidize heavily social services but not to the extent of the Scandinavian countries. Anglo-Saxon countries have generally lower taxation and welfare transfers, so they have relatively larger sectors 1 and 3, and correspondingly smaller sector 2 share. Finally, southern European countries do not give support to market-based social care and have the smallest relative size for sector 2. Japan and Korea are in line with southern European countries with no subsidy to market-based social care.

Our model is in terms of hours of work with no fixed costs of going to work or indivisible labour. The distribution of employment, however, is consistent with the distribution of hours of work and results would not differ if we focused on employment. Figure 2 shows the percentage distribution of employment across the three sectors, with similar country rankings and shares. The correlation coefficients between the hours share and the employment share for sectors 1, 2 and 3, are, respectively, 0.88, 0.98 and 0.88.

Policy is characterized by three types of instruments, taxes, health and social care subsidies, and lump-sum transfers. Lump-sum transfers are not relevant for our analysis but the other two instruments are. The tax rates on labor income, consumer spending and employment can be calculated from national accounts data given in OECD publications (see the Appendix). For each country we also calculated the employment subsidy rate as the ratio of total spending on “active employment measures” to the wage bill. The combination of these taxes net of the employment subsidy gives the tax wedge for sectors 1 and 3.

For the health and social work sector, different countries follow different
subsidization policies, and detailed case by case modeling for each country is not feasible. We follow a common approach to defining the subsidy rate, which captures the extent of subsidization of this sector. We calculated two alternative subsidy rates, one applying to social care only and one including health subsidies.

The main substitution between market and home is in social care. Our first subsidy measure includes the value of “benefits in kind” in social care, reported in SOCX, which is mainly the money governments spent on subsidizing day care centres for pre-school children and homes for older people. The second subsidy adds to this health spending on benefits in kind. Health spending is on average much larger than social care spending but it encompasses both medical services and drugs and medical equipment, which are not part of the output of the health sector. Health expenditure data for the United States shows that about half the health spending is on drugs and equipment and the other half on medical services.\(^\text{12}\) We applied this fraction to all countries and so divided by 2 the total health subsidy reported in SOCX. Adding the result to social care spending yields our second health and social care subsidy.

The subsidy rate on health and social care is defined as the ratio of each subsidy amount calculated as in the preceding paragraph, to the gross output of the health and social work sector. As the value-added of private health and social care services is not taxed, the subsidy rate calculated for each country is the net expenditure tax on the model’s sector 2, which is a negative number in all countries. The simple correlation coefficient between the two calculated subsidy rates is 0.87, so countries that heavily subsidize social care also subsidize health more generously, and conversely. Our results are very similar for the two rates and for space reasons the detailed results that we report are for the narrower definition only, mentioning only briefly some results for the broader measure. We prefer the narrower definition because the main market-home substitution is in social care and this rate includes only items that are directly measured.

Figure 3 shows the calculated tax wedge for health and social work, based on the narrower subsidy that excludes health, and the tax wedge for the rest of the economy. Countries are sorted according to the differential between the two rates. As expected, the Scandinavian countries have the biggest differential between the two tax rates and the south European and North

\(^{12}\)The *Consumption Expenditure Survey* (CEX) of the United States for 2003 gives the following expenditure breakdowns for health care: 3.1% on health insurance, 1.4% on medical services, 1.1% on drugs and 0.3% on medical supplies. Excluding insurance, the spending on medical services is 50% of total health spending. Insurance spending can be assumed to be in the same proportions as private spending.
American countries the smallest. A striking feature of the data shown in Figure 3 is the cross-country variation in the two rates. There is much more variation in social subsidies than in total taxes: the total tax wedge ranges from nearly 50% in Sweden to 27% in Korea, in contrast to the tax wedge for health and social work, which ranges from −40% in Norway to +26% in Italy.\textsuperscript{13} The correlation coefficient between the two tax wedges is equal to −0.41, picking up the obvious fact that tax rates are higher in the countries that give more social care subsidies.\textsuperscript{14}

3 Parameter values

The key equations used in the predictions of the market shares are (16), (17) and (18). Equation (17) shows that the impact of the parameters on the ratio of hours can be divided into the impact of the substitution across the three market goods and the impact of the substitution between market and home production. However, because the expenditure taxes in sectors 1 and 3 are the same, the relative size of sector 3 to sector 1 is unaffected by the cross-market substitution. Policy influences on the ratio of hours in sector 3 to sector 1 work only through the market-home substitution. Equation (16) shows that this substitution is influenced by the common tax wedge of the two sectors.

We study the impact of policy on market shares by investigating each substitution channel separately - across market goods due to the $\varepsilon$ elasticity, for given home production time, and between market and home due to the $\sigma_j$ elasticity. The elasticity values that we used in the computations were chosen as follows.

Beginning with $\sigma_j$, we have estimates in the literature of the elasticity of substitution between all of home production and all market goods. These estimates are in the range 1.5 − 2.3.\textsuperscript{15} In our model $\sigma_j$ is the elasticity of substitution between market and home goods in two sub-sectors of the economy, where there might be different substitution possibilities. Sector 3, however,

\textsuperscript{13}In all countries, the health and social care wedge is made up of a negative expenditure tax (the social care subsidy) and two positive taxes, the income tax and the employment tax. Depending on their relative size, the outcome could be either positive or negative.

\textsuperscript{14}Recently, Ohanian, Raifo and Rogerson (2008) used a different method from ours to construct a whole-economy tax wedge for a sub-sample of the OECD countries in our sample. The correlation coefficient between our tax wedge for sectors 1 and 3 and theirs is 0.88. The only apparent difference in the rank comparisons is that their method makes Spain and Australia lower tax countries than our methods do.

\textsuperscript{15}See Rupert, Rogerson and Wright (1995), McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright (1997) and Chang and Schorfheide (2003).
includes virtually all the services that drive the aggregate elasticity of substitution (except for family care). With this selection of services we would expect the substitution possibilities between sector 3 and home production to be stronger than for the economy as a whole. In view of this, a value in the upper range of the aggregate estimates is more appropriate. We choose $\sigma_3 = 2.3$ as our benchmark, although even higher values might be appropriate. For the health and social work sector, the substitution elasticity is likely to depend on the breakdown of the sector between the health and social work components, and on family views about the closeness of market-provided childcare to family-provided care. We have no information from direct estimates for either and we used the same value as for sector 3 in our benchmark, $\sigma_2 = 2.3$, although we report also results for lower values.

The elasticity $\varepsilon$ is the price elasticity of the three consumption aggregates in our model. In estimates based on models without home production, this is also the price elasticity of demand. But with home production the estimated elasticity is a weighted average of the $\sigma$ and $\varepsilon$ elasticities, with weights that depend on all the parameters of the model. On the assumption that $\sigma > \varepsilon$, in a model with home production the $\varepsilon$ elasticity should be less than the estimated overall price elasticity of demand.

Estimates of the price elasticity of demand for service goods or sub-groups within services are all below 1, and usually in the range 0 – 0.3. More recently, Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2009), addressing this issue with consumption expenditure data for the United States for 1947-2007, show that the expenditure estimate of the elasticity of substitution across agriculture, manufacturing and service goods is around 0.8. But since our production functions are for value added, a more appropriate elasticity is the one derived for the value-added components for each sector. For this estimate they derive an elasticity close to 0.

Given that the $\varepsilon$ of our model should be less than the estimated demand elasticities in econometric studies because of the home production component, and it should be closer to the value-added estimate of Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2009), the upper value estimate of 0.3 of the econometric studies seems to be an upper bound for this elasticity, with 0 a lower bound.

\footnote{Rogerson (2008) aggregates all services together and uses a “conservative” elasticity 1.8. His service aggregate includes specialized services for which there is no home substitute, so it should be less than ours.}

\footnote{See Falvey and Gemmell (1996), Summers (1985) and Blundell, Pashardes and Weber (1993) for micro-econometric estimates.}
Table 4: Alternative tax regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>sample means</th>
<th>lo uniform</th>
<th>hi uniform</th>
<th>lo subsidy</th>
<th>hi subsidy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$t_1, t_3$</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_2$</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_{w1}, t_{w3}$</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t_{w2}$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lo uniform applies a uniform tax to all sectors, with the level set at the sector 1 and 3 value for Japan. Hi uniform does the same but sets the tax rates at the levels for Sweden. The lo subsidy column gives the actual rates for Japan and the hi subsidy column gives the actual rates for Sweden.

4 A quantitative example

We begin our quantitative applications by illustrating the interaction between the cross-market and market-home substitutions that drive our results, with reference to the example discussed in the introduction and summarized in Table 1. The purpose of the example is to derive the impact on the distribution of work of uniform taxation, social care subsidies and different values of the elasticities of substitution. We assume that all parameters are uniform across the countries used in this example, except for their tax and subsidy policies. In light of this, the only parameters needed to get predictions, except for the policy parameters, are the two elasticity measures, $\sigma$ and $\varepsilon$.

There are four tax rates that have an impact on allocations, the expenditure taxes $t_1$ and $t_2$, and the tax wedges $t_{w1}$ and $t_{w2}$. Sector 3 has the same tax rates as sector 1. Table 4 shows the sample means for these tax rates and the values that are used in the illustration. The latter set are drawn from the rates calculated for Sweden and Japan, the extreme countries shown in Table 1. The column headed “lo uniform” assumes that the country is a low tax country (like Japan) and (unlike Japan) does not subsidize health and social care. The column headed “hi uniform” also assumes that there are no subsidies but taxes are as high as in Sweden. The other two columns make the same assumptions about taxes but introduce the subsidies observed in Japan and Sweden.

Solving the model for the sample means and for $\varepsilon = 0.3$ and $\sigma_2 = \sigma_3 = 2.3$, we obtain the sector shares shown in the second column of Table 5. When taxation is uniform across the three sectors, and is increased from the low Japanese rates to the high Swedish rates, the distribution of work shifts from the sectors with home substitutes, 2 and 3, to the sector without
substitutes, 1. The home-market substitution is the only driving force behind the changes in the market shares in this case. Sectors 2 and 3 lose hours in similar proportions, but because sector 3 is the bigger one, most of the fall in the percentage share is in this sector. So if, for example, Sweden had the same taxes as at present, but did not use part of the revenue to subsidize health and social care, its health and social work sector would have occupied only 4.2% of total market hours, with the bulk of care taking place in the home.

When the subsidies for sector 2 are introduced, in the last two columns of Table 5, both other shares fall, approximately by the same proportion, and the share of sector 2 increases dramatically. The model predictions for Sweden are very close to the data shown in Table 1. Sector 1 gains from the high tax at the expense of sectors 2 and 3, which have home substitutes, and then sector 2 gains from the subsidy at the expense of sectors 1 and 3. Sector 1 share is almost unaffected by the policy, because the two substitution channels offset each other. But sector 3 share falls dramatically because both substitution channels act in the same direction. Japan has low taxation so it has a higher sector 3 share than Sweden, but not as high as it would have had with no taxes at all. The model’s predictions for Japan are again very close to the data shown in Table 1.

It is clear from the discussion and from the computations shown in Table 5, that the home-market substitution is crucial in explaining the large variations observed in the share of sector 3 across the countries in the sample. If we assume that the elasticity of substitution between market goods and home goods is zero, we get for Sweden, for example, respective shares of the three sectors of 62.2, 10.4 and 27.4. Compared with the results in the hi-subsidy case in Table 5, we find that the share of sector 1 is less by 2 percentage points, but the share of sector 2 is less by 5 points and that of sector 3 is higher by 7 points. The value of $\varepsilon$, the elasticity of substitution across goods, required to bring the prediction of health and social work up to the 15.5% level of Table 5 is 2.1, but at that level (and $\sigma_j = 0$ for both $j = 2, 3$) the share of sector 1 is 55 and the share of sector 3 is 30.5, which are far off the data points.

We argued that the estimates of the elasticity of substitution between market and home production in the literature give a lower bound on $\sigma_3$ but we have less information about the value of $\sigma_2$, which concerns a single service. The results are, however, robust to reasonable variations of this parameter. Holding $\sigma_3 = 2.3$ and reducing the value of $\sigma_2$ from 2.3 to 0 reduces the share of sector 2 from 15.5% to 11.3%, with a corresponding increase in the share of sector 1 and virtually no change in the share of sector 3. But even at $\sigma_2$ close to 1, the share of sector 2 is 13%, that of sector 1, 66% and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>sample means</th>
<th>lo uniform</th>
<th>hi uniform</th>
<th>lo subsidy</th>
<th>hi subsidy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5:
Predicted sector shares under alternative tax regimes

that of sector 3, 21%. So the model is robust to reasonable variations in the
elasticity of substitution between home and market care, and in what follows
we concentrate on the benchmark \( \sigma_2 = \sigma_3 = 2.3 \).

The main contribution of this example was to show that in order to
reconcile the small country differences in the share of sector 1, with the large
differences in the shares of the other two sectors, the model requires a low
\( \varepsilon \) elasticity and a high \( \sigma_j \) elasticity, especially for sector 3. Both these are
consistent with the empirical estimates of these elasticities.

5 Explaining country differences: Substitutions
across market goods

If we shut down the market-home substitution channel (e.g., by evaluating the
model solutions at \( \psi_j = 1 \)), the only elasticity capable of explaining the cross-
country differences in the distribution of hours of work is the one between
final consumption goods, \( \varepsilon \). We argued that econometric estimates place this
elasticity in the range 0 – 0.3, which gives limited substitution possibilities.
We show in this section that when the home production substitution is shut
down, the taxes and subsidies that we have computed push country hours
distributions in the “right” direction, but they are not large enough to explain
the large differences in actual distributions, given the small \( \varepsilon \). Moreover,
if we allow \( \varepsilon \) to take larger values, the explanatory power of this channel
improves, but it fails in another dimension, the unbalanced responses of the
three sectors to the tax differentials.

For \( \psi_j = 1 \) equations (17) and (18) yield,

\[
\frac{l_j}{\bar{l}_1} = \left( \frac{\omega_j}{\omega_1} \right)^{\varepsilon} \left( \frac{A_j}{A_1} \right)^{-(1-\varepsilon)} \left( \frac{1 + t_j}{1 + t_1} \right)^{-\varepsilon}.
\]  

(19)

For sector 2, \( t_2 < t_1 \) in all countries in the sample, but for sector 3, \( t_3 = t_1 \). Taxes therefore cannot predict differences in the ratio \( l_3/l_1 \) without the
market-home substitution, but they could predict differences in the ratio $l_2/l_1$. These differences imply differences in market shares, which we compare with the data that we described in section 2. In deviations from log means we obtain, for each country in the sample,

$$\ln \frac{l_{2i}}{l_{1i}} - E_j \ln \frac{l_{2j}}{l_{1j}} = -\varepsilon \left( \ln \frac{1 + t_{2i}}{1 + t_{1i}} - E_j \ln \frac{1 + t_{2j}}{1 + t_{1j}} \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

where $i$ and $j$ are country identifiers and $E$ in front of the log denotes the sample mean. We use (20) to obtain a prediction for the ratio $l_2/l_1$ for each country.

The predictions for $\varepsilon = 0.3$, which we consider to be at the upper end of the most reasonable values at this level of aggregation, have a good correlation with the data but do not have enough variation. The simple correlation coefficient between the prediction obtained from (20) and the data for the 19 countries is 0.86. The standard deviation of the data, however, is seven times as big as the standard deviation of the prediction. The conclusion that can be reached from this is that the impact of taxes and subsidies on the relative size of sector 2 is significant and in the right direction. But the quantitative impact of the calculated tax rates when only market substitutions are considered is too small to explain the data.

We show in Figure 4a the predictions for market shares obtained from (20). Applying the methodology of (20) to sector 3 as well gives a “naive” prediction for $\ln l_3/l_1$ at the sample means. Using the two predictions in (8) we obtain a prediction for the share of market hours in sector 2, shown in Figure 4a. The lines drawn in this figure are the 45° line and lines for the sample means of the data and prediction, which are the same by construction. An “ideal” prediction would have all the points lying along the 45° line, whereas a naive prediction would have them along the sample mean line. The predictions shown in Figure 4a are clearly superior to the “naive” predictions, but they are a long way from the ideal ones. The mean absolute distance of the predictions from the 45° line is 2.68, compared with the naive prediction’s 3.02.

The predictions in Figure 4a were derived with the tax rate obtained when only social work subsidies are taken into account. The predictions with the broader measure of subsidies that includes also half of health spending by the government are very similar and not reported. The correlation coefficient between the prediction for $l_2/l_1$ with the data is 0.81, but the standard deviation of the data is 5.2 times as large as the standard deviation of the prediction.

The substitution margin that drives the results in Figure 4a is across market sectors only. It predicts that as health and social care are subsidized,
and the other sectors taxed, consumers switch their consumption from the other market goods to health and social care. Our finding is that such a switch takes place, but because health and social care are not sufficiently close substitutes to other market goods there cannot be large substitutions, even when there are large subsidies to health and social care. It is natural to conclude from this that had there been more substitution possibilities the model would have performed better. A log-linear regression estimate of (20) gives $\varepsilon = 1.7$ for the whole sample and $\varepsilon = 1.4$ when Korea (which is an outlier) is excluded from the estimation, with a large increase in $R^2$. The best fitting line to the share data is between these, at about 1.5. Figure 4b shows the predicted series for the share of sector 2 for $\varepsilon = 1.5$. A regression line through the points virtually coincides with the 45° line, and gives a good fit ($R^2 = 0.72$), which shows that the best-fitting specification explains a large part of the variation in the employment share of health and social work. The absolute mean deviation of these predictions from the 45° line (including Korea, which is an outlier) is 1.76, only 58% of the distance of the data points from the sample mean. However, the caveat remains that the value of the elasticity required to give this fit is far off the range of plausible values, as we discussed earlier on.

One might still ask if a simpler model that ignores home production, combined with a high value for $\varepsilon$, is a useful shortcut that might explain the data. The answer is that it is not, because of the symmetric response of the other two sectors to the health and social work subsidies. This goes against the evidence shown in Figure 1, where there is more variation in the share of sector 3, and its share is better correlated with the share of sector 2 than is the share of sector 1. Computing the implied share of sector 3 for $\varepsilon = 0.3$ and $\varepsilon = 1.5$ improves the prediction of the sector 3 share over the mean, but only marginally. The absolute deviation of the data from the sample mean for sector 3 is 2.84, for $\varepsilon = 0.3$ it is 2.79 and for the best fitting $\varepsilon = 1.5$ it is 2.43. So although a high $\varepsilon$ is a useful shortcut as an explanation of the differences in the share of sector 2 in terms of taxes and subsidies, it implies too large a response of sector 1 hours and too small a response of sector 3 hours.

6 Substitutions between market and home production

When we allow for the substitution between market and home goods, our model can explain with conventional parameters both the bigger impact of
policy on the hours distribution across countries and the asymmetric response of sectors 1 and 3. We investigate first the impact of home production on the hours distribution conditional on observed home production. By doing this we are allowing for the differences in home production that are not due to policy to also influence the cross-market distributions. Following this we investigate the impact of policy on home production differences across countries.

Formally, in this section we are fixing the marketization of time \( l_j/l_{jh} \) for sectors 2 and 3 at the observed values in all countries, and derive the optimal allocations across the three market sectors, conditional on the observed marketizations. By fixing the marketization of time, we are effectively also fixing the marketization of consumption, so the question that we are investigating in this section is whether equation (17) does a good job predicting the employment shares, given the observed values for the tax ratios and the marketization ratios. The only difficulty with this prediction is that the marketization of consumption is not observed, so we need to replace it with a term that has the observed marketization of time in its place.

Making use of the production functions for market and home goods, we obtain,

\[
\frac{c_i}{c_i^*} = \left[ \psi_i + (1 - \psi_i) \left( \frac{c_i}{c_{ih}} \right)^{-\frac{(\sigma_i - 1)}{\sigma_i}} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma_i}{(\sigma_i - 1)}} = \psi_i^{-\frac{\sigma_i}{(\sigma_i - 1)}} \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{\psi_i} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{A_i}{A_{ih}} \right)^{-\frac{(\sigma_i - 1)}{\sigma_i}} \left( \frac{l_i}{l_{ih}} \right)^{-\frac{(\sigma_i - 1)}{\sigma_i}} \right]^{-\frac{\sigma_i}{(\sigma_i - 1)}} \tag{21}
\]

Substitution of (21) into (17) yields

\[
\ln \frac{l_j}{l_1} = \varepsilon \ln \frac{\omega_j}{\omega_1} + \frac{\sigma_j (1 - \varepsilon)}{\sigma_j - 1} \ln \psi_j - (1 - \varepsilon) \ln \frac{A_i}{A_j} - \varepsilon \ln \left( \frac{1 + t_j}{1 + t_1} \right) - \frac{\sigma_j - \varepsilon}{\sigma_j - 1} \ln \left( 1 + x_j \left( \frac{l_j}{l_{jh}} \right)^{-\frac{(\sigma_j - 1)}{\sigma_j}} \right) \tag{22}
\]

where \( x_j \equiv (1/\psi_j - 1) (A_j/A_{jh})^{-\frac{(\sigma_j - 1)}{\sigma_j}} \) is a function of preference and productivity parameters. Taking a log-linear approximation to the last term of (22) about the sample mean, we obtain,

\[
\ln \left( 1 + x_j \left( \frac{l_j}{l_{jh}} \right)^{-\frac{(\sigma_j - 1)}{\sigma_j}} \right) = \ln (1 + x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}) + \frac{x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}}{1 + x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}} \frac{\sigma_j - 1}{\sigma_j} \left( \ln \left( \frac{l_j}{l_{jh}} \right) - E \ln \left( \frac{l_j}{l_{jh}} \right) \right) \tag{23}
\]
where \( \bar{z}_j \) is the sample mean of \( z_j = -(\sigma_j - 1)/\sigma_j ) \ln (l_j/l_{jh}) \).

As before, we use the model to make predictions of the allocations across countries in deviations from sample means. Combining (22) and (23), we obtain

\[
\ln \frac{l_{ji}}{l_{1i}} - E_k \ln \frac{l_{jk}}{l_{1k}} = -\varepsilon \left( \ln \frac{1 + t_{ji}}{1 + t_{1i}} - E_k \ln \frac{1 + t_{jk}}{1 + t_{1k}} \right) - \frac{x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}}{1 + x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}} \frac{\sigma_j - \varepsilon}{\sigma_j} \left( \ln \left( \frac{l_{ji}}{l_{jhi}} \right) - E_k \ln \left( \frac{l_{jk}}{l_{jhk}} \right) \right)
\]

where \( i \) and \( k \) are country identifiers and \( j \) is the sector identifier, taking the values 2 or 3.

For sector 2, each country’s deviation from the sample mean is the sum of two terms. The expenditure tax terms that were computed before from (20), and a second term that is due to home production. For sector 3 the only term in the prediction is the home production term in (24), as there are no tax distortions between sectors 1 and 3 and \( t_3 = t_1 \).

The coefficient \( x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}/(1 + x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}) \) is a number between 0 and 1 but we have no information on its value, being a combination of preference and technology parameters over market and home consumption. If this coefficient is 0, home production plays no role in the allocation of market work, so it is obviously important for our results. However, it turns out that the results are robust to a large range of values for this coefficient, once it exceeds a low value such as 0.2. We adopted the following approach to finding a value for it. \( \bar{z}_j \) can be calculated directly from the data on home and market production. To get a value for \( x_j \) we assume that the productivity ratio \( A_j/A_{jh} \) is 1 in both sectors, as these are low-skill services, and that the preference ratio \( (1 - \psi_j)/\psi_j \) is equal to the average ratio of the shares of market to home production. These targets hold exactly for \( \sigma_j = 1 \), but we do not impose this restriction on \( \sigma_j \) in any of the other calculations. The outcome for each sector is,\(^{18}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}}{1 + x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}} \frac{\sigma_j - \varepsilon}{\sigma_j} & = 0.64 \\
\frac{x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}}{1 + x_j e^{\bar{z}_j}} \frac{\sigma_j - \varepsilon}{\sigma_j} & = 0.80.
\end{align*}
\]

The predictions for the ratios \( l_2/l_1 \) and \( l_3/l_1 \), when the values in (25) and (26) are used, are now much closer to the data than they were without the

\(^{18}\)A log linear regression estimate of (24) over the cross section of 19 countries gives the following estimates for this coefficient: 0.67 for sector 2, with \( p \) value 0.0003, and 0.34 for sector 3, with \( p \) value 0.0007. The regression for sector 2 also gives an estimate for \( \varepsilon \), but still one that we would regard to be too high, 0.77, with \( p \) value 0.03.
home production terms. For sector 2, the standard deviation of the data series is only 1.33 times the standard deviation of the predicted series, and the correlation between the two series is 0.89. Moreover, these predictions are virtually identical to the ones for a lower $\sigma_2$. For $\sigma_2 = 1.5$, the ratio between the standard deviation of the data to the prediction is 1.49, and the correlation between the two series remains at 0.89. For sector 3 the standard deviation of the data is only 0.44 times the standard deviation of the prediction, with correlation 0.55, but this is largely due to Korea, which is an outlier. If Korea is omitted from the sample, the ratio of the standard deviations becomes 0.62 and their correlation coefficient is also 0.62.

We now use these predictions, including Korea, to derive predictions for the sector market shares. These are shown in Figures 5a and 5b for $\sigma_2 = \sigma_3 = 2.3$.\footnote{The predictions for $\sigma_2 = 1.5$ are virtually indistinguishable from the ones shown.} The model fits the data well for both sectors, except for the Korea outlier in sector 3. As before, the three lines are the 45° line and the lines for the sample means. The model picks up well the Scandinavian group of countries in both sectors, as well as the smaller deviations across the other countries. The large majority of countries, and all the ones with large deviations from the sample mean, are pushed towards the 45° line by the model. The average absolute difference between the data and the prediction for sector 2 is 1.45, compared with the deviation between data and sample mean of 3.02. In sector 3, the model is also pushing the vast majority of countries towards the 45° line but the averages are distorted because of the Korea outlier. The average absolute deviation between data and prediction is 3.14, compared with the average distance between data and sample mean of 2.84. But when Korea is omitted, the model’s average distance from the data goes down to 2.64.\footnote{The problem with Korea is that it has extremely high marketization ratio in sector 3. The model then predicts extremely high market share for this sector, but in the data it is not as high because market hours are also very high for sector 1. None of the papers that attempt to predict differences in market hours across countries with taxes include Korea in their sample. The extremely high number of aggregate market hours in that country would defy any prediction based on policy.}

7 Can taxes and subsidies explain marketization?

We conclude that a combination of symmetric cross-market substitutions with asymmetric market-home substitutions explain the observed differences in the distribution of hours of work, but can taxes explain the cross-country
differences in the marketization of time? The key marketization equation of
the model is (16), which makes the marketization of time a log-linear function
of preference parameters, productivity parameters and the tax wedge. As in
previous sections, we assume that preferences and productivities are com-
mon across the countries of the sample and investigate the extent to which
differences in the tax wedge can explain the observed differences in the mar-
ketization of time. Figures 6a and 6b show the results with the elasticities
of substitution previously used, 2.3 in both sectors.\footnote{Simple log-linear regressions of equation (16) with the 19 observations for sectors 2
and 3 give respectively $\sigma_2 = 1.3 (p = 0.057)$ and $\sigma_3 = 2.2 (p = 0.0005)$. This ranking
is consistent with our discussion in section 3. Moreover, as we have already argued, the
predictions of the share of sector 2 with an elasticity like the estimated one are virtually
indistinguishable from the predictions with $\sigma_2 = 2.3$.}
The model picks up
well the difference between the Scandinavian countries and the rest of the
sample in the marketization of family care, but the specification cannot dis-
tinguish between the other countries on the basis of the tax wedge alone.\footnote{Several writers have written about the differences in the way that OECD citizens view
the role of social care and family-related work in the home and the market, so differences
in tastes may play a role here. See for example, Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), and Algan
and Cahuc (2009).}
The correlation between data and prediction with $\sigma_2 = 2.3$ is 0.64. Results
are virtually identical for a lower elasticity of substitution. For $\sigma_2 = 1.5$, the
correlation improves slightly to 0.65 but the graph of the predictions against
the data is indistinguishable from Figure 6a. Similarly, when the broader
subsidy that includes health is included, the results are also very similar to
the ones shown in Figure 6a. The correlation between data and predictions
for the broader measure is 0.60 for $\sigma_2 = 2.3$ and rises to 0.63 for $\sigma_2 = 1.5$.

In contrast, the marketization of other services is explained well by the
different tax rates, with the exception of Korea, which is an outlier. As
before, the problem with this country is that its market hours in sector 3
are extremely high when compared with other countries, and with the lowest
home hours in the sample as well it yields a ratio of market to home that is
too high to be explained by policy alone. But even with Korea included in
the predictions, the correlation coefficient between data and predictions for
$\sigma = 2.3$, as shown in Figure 6b, is 0.73.

\section{Conclusions}

We summarize the main findings as showing that the large differences in
the allocation of market work across the countries of the OECD can be at-
tributed to the differences in taxation, the subsidization of social work and

\footnote{Simple log-linear regressions of equation (16) with the 19 observations for sectors 2
and 3 give respectively $\sigma_2 = 1.3 (p = 0.057)$ and $\sigma_3 = 2.2 (p = 0.0005)$. This ranking
is consistent with our discussion in section 3. Moreover, as we have already argued, the
predictions of the share of sector 2 with an elasticity like the estimated one are virtually
indistinguishable from the predictions with $\sigma_2 = 2.3$.}

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and Cahuc (2009).}
the market-home production substitution. Taxes and subsidies cause substitutions along two dimensions, across market goods because of different tax rates applying to different goods, and between market and home production because home production is neither taxed nor subsidized. The interaction between these two margins explains both the quantitative impact of policy and the asymmetric response of different sectors to the taxes and subsidies; in particular the fact that the main differences in the allocation of hours of work across countries are in health and social work and in unskilled services. The market-home production substitution is the key explanation to the asymmetric response, because of the different substitution possibilities between market and home work.

We demonstrated these claims by making use of data on taxes and social expenditure from the OECD, home production data from time use surveys, and disaggregated data on hours of work by sector. We were able to do this for nineteen OECD countries with favorable results.

9 Data appendix

Time use data

Time use data record activities at regular intervals (e.g. every 15 minutes) during a 24-hour day. For the purposes of this paper we extracted from time use surveys two numbers, time spent on caring for a child or an adult household member, including related travel time, and other home work time.

Home work in time use surveys includes activities that could be delegated but are done by members of the household, either inside or outside the home. The main activities are shopping, house and garden cleaning and maintenance, cooking, laundry, pet care and car care. Travel time is included with the corresponding activities, e.g. travel time to shops is included in shopping. Childcare is a separate item. Caring for others within the household is a separate item, although some surveys at our disposal did not report separately this item. The item is small, accounting for less than 20% of childcare time, and where missing we constructed a series for it from other information, as explained below. Caring for others outside the family was reported separately by a very small number of surveys but we could not get data for it for most countries. Where reported it was a very small item. Most surveys included it with other small activities in “other voluntary work”, a small item that is part of other home production time.

The main data source for the European countries is the Harmonised European Time Use Survey (HETUS: https://www.testh2.scb.se/tus/tus/). It
was the result of a cooperation between a number of national statistical institutions and Eurostat in the 1990s, with the objective to harmonize time use statistics in the European Union. The HETUS covers 9 of our 19 countries around the year 2000. They are Belgium (1998), Finland (1999), France (1998), Germany (2001), Italy (2002), Norway (2000), Spain (2002), Sweden (2000, age group 20+) and the United Kingdom (2000). Detailed national tables for each country are downloadable from the HETUS website. Each national table reports time use of population by age. We compute the time use for the 15+ category by weighting each group by its population size, using population data from the United Nations, World Population Prospects (http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2).

The HETUS does not report explicitly the time taken for caring for household members. We obtained accurate data from the national source used by HETUS for Finland, Germany, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. For the other countries HETUS reports a residual aggregate of “other household work,” which includes caring for others as one of the main items. For Belgium and Italy we used Spain’s ratio of “caring for others” to the HETUS “other household work” to get the time of caring for others from the HETUS residual. For France the HETUS residual was clearly misreported, as it was 1 minute a day for all age groups. We increased France’s childcare time by Spain’s fraction of caring for others to childcare. Finally, for Sweden we used the average decomposition of “other household work” for Norway and Denmark to obtain the time for caring for others from the HETUS aggregate.

For the remaining 10 countries, we use national time use statistics, as follows (in some cases, as indicated below, it was not possible to obtain data for the 15+ category but for a near age group):


Canada: General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by Statistics Canada in 1998 and available online through http://www.statcan.gc.ca/. Adult care is included in a residual “other household work”. We used the US fractions to decompose this item into caring for others and other items.

Denmark: Data are available only in Danish for 2001, age groups 15-74, translated and tabulated for this paper by Jens Bonker of the Rockwool Foundation Research Unit, Copenhagen (to whom we express our thanks).

Ireland: The Irish National Time-Use Survey 2005 is a pilot survey conducted by Economic and Social Research Institute for the Department of Justices, Equality and Law Reform. We obtained the time use table from the publication, Time-Use in Ireland 2005: Survey Report. Age group 18+. (http://www.ucd.ie/issda/dataset-info/timeuse.htm)

Korea: Data provided for this paper by the Korea Labor Institute, Seoul, following a visit by one of the authors in 2008 (C Pissarides). Data for 1999, age group 10+ (data also available for 2004 with virtually identical results).

Netherlands: Netherlands Institute for Social Research. At the time of writing detailed tables were available online in English but now discontinued. We obtained our aggregates from Burda et al. (2008), age group 20-74.


Portugal: *1999 Time Use Survey*, conducted by Instituto Nacional De Estatistica (INE). Table and document (in Portuguese) are downloadable from: http://www.ine.pt/


**Hours of work**

Sectoral hours were obtained mainly from the database *Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach* (EU KLEMS), http://www.euklems.net/, file extension .08I, released March 2008. The following KLEMS sectors are in each one of our sectors:

- **Sector 1** includes KLEMS Sectors A (agriculture, hunting, forestry), B (fishing), C (mining and quarrying), D (manufacturing), E (electricity, gas, water), F (construction), G51 (wholesale trade), I62 (air transport), I64 (post and telecommunications), J (financial intermediation), K (real estate, renting and business services), O91 (activities of membership organizations nec) O911t2 (media activities)

- **Sector 2** is the KLEMS sector N (health and social work)

- **Sector 3** includes the KLEMS sectors G50 (sale and maintenance of motor vehicles and motorcycles), G52 (retail trade), H (hotels and restaurants), I60 (inland transport), I61 (other water transport), I63 (other supporting travel activities), O00 (sewage and refuse disposal), O92 (recreational, cultural and sporting activities), O923t7 (other recreational activities), O93 (other service activities)

Three countries are not in KLEMS: Canada, Norway, and New Zealand. We constructed their shares from the KLEMS predecessor, the OECD *Structural Analysis Database* (STAN), following the same sector decomposition.
Some data entries are missing. In all cases the missing entries were for very small sectors. We constructed the missing data series by assuming that the shares of the missing series within its sector were the same as the corresponding shares in neighboring countries with a similar industrial structure. In most cases the missing data were for media activities (sector O92 1&2). In the United States, where this sector is relatively large, it accounts for about 30% of hours in sector O, which accounts for about 6% of total hours. The “similar” country shares used to construct the media sector in the countries that it is missing were selected as follows: for Denmark we used the media’s hours share for Finland. For Italy we used Spain’s. For Japan we used Korea’s. For the Netherlands we used the UK’s. For Sweden we used Finland’s.

STAN does not have a breakdown of hours for New Zealand but it has total hours. We obtained employment data for industrial sectors by status (part time or full time) from the website of Statistics New Zealand, to calculate the shares of employment in individual sectors (weighting part-time employment by 25/40), and then multiplied these shares by total weekly hours for the 15+ population to obtain hours in each sector.

For Canada no data are available for the decomposition of sector O, we use US’s shares to allocate hours within sector O sub-sectors. Similarly for Norway, we used Finland’s shares to allocate total sector O hours to its components.

The population aged 15 and above that was used to derive per capita hours was obtained from World Developments Indicators.

**Taxes**

The tax rates were calculated from the data given in Nickell (2006), the OECD/CEP data set. Briefly, they are as follows.

The employment tax rate is defined as \(\frac{ESS}{IE - ESS}\), with \(ESS\) equal to employers’ social security contributions and \(IE\) equal to total compensation for employees. \(ESS\) is available from the OECD National Accounts and \(IE\) from the OECD Revenue Statistics.

The direct tax rate is defined as \(\frac{DT}{HCR}\), with \(DT\) equal to income tax plus employees’ social security contributions and \(HCR\) equal to household current receipts. Income tax and employees’ social security contributions were taken from the OECD Revenue Statistics. \(HCR\) was calculated from the OECD National Accounts as the sum of compensation of employees, property income, social contributions and benefits and other current transfers.

The indirect tax rate is defined as \(\frac{TX - SB}{CC}\), with \(TX\) equal to indirect taxes, \(SB\) equal to subsidies and \(CC\) household final expenditures. All three
were taken from OECD National Accounts.

For the employment subsidy we obtained total spending on active labour market measures (code 600) from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) and divided it by total employee compensation from KLEMS. Data are missing for New Zealand, and we set this rate at the Australian rate (generally, this is a very small number for all countries).

The rates used in the paper were averages for 1994-2003. Most countries had complete data sets and all countries had at least some entries for those years, which were used to arrive at averages. The only exception is Korea, for which there were no tax data at all. For this country only we used the tax data available at the OECD National Accounts: Korea.

Social subsidies

The social subsidies are available in SOCX, 1980-2003, released 2007. Social expenditure are given as a percentage of each country’s GDP. We multiplied by GDP from the OECD National Accounts to obtain the absolute amounts, and then divided by the gross output of the health and social work sector, available in KLEMS, to obtain the rates. The value of “benefits in kind” for the following social expenditure categories were aggregated to arrive at the social subsidy: old age (code 120), incapacity (code 320), and family (code 520). In all these categories the benefits in kind were for residential or day care and home-help services. The common feature uniting these items was that the employees delivering these “benefits in kind” worked in the health and social work sector.

Our broader health and social subsidy adds half of total spending on Health care, (code 420), also available in SOCX.

References


Figure 1. Percentage distribution of hours of work, 1994-2003, sorted according to sector 2 size

Figure 2. Percentage distribution of employment, 1994-2003, sorted according to sector 2 size
Figure 3. The calculated tax wedge, 1994-2003 (social subsidies only)
Figure 5a
Predicted sector 2 share, home production exogenous

Figure 5b
Predicted sector 3 share, home production exogenous
**Figure 6a**
Actual and predicted marketization in health and social work

**Figure 6b**
Actual and predicted marketization in other services