A number of scientific publications in important MERIT topics is planned to be delivered by the consortium to reflect the findings of the research work carried out within the project. Papers will be submitted for publication in peer-reviewed journals, books and repositories and where applicable Open Research Europe will be utilised to that end. In any case all research work will be published in full open access outlets once completed and peer-reviewed.
Should we be wary of the role of scientific publishers in Open Science?
Adrien Fillon, Zacharias Maniadis, Eva Méndez and Pablo Sánchez- Núñez
Abstract
"We wish to express our concern for the role of for-profit scientific publishers in understanding and appropriating what “Open Science” means. This role can be characterised as opportunistic, and has led to an interpretation that can cause considerable confusion when we identify Open Science with Open Access and Open Access with" paying for publishing”....
Optimal Culpability in Research Teams.
With Erika Domotor and Nikolas Tsakas. SSRN Working Paper (2024). Under Review.
Abstract
"Recent scandals in science have brought attention to the problem of detecting fraud and attributing punishment in the context of increasingly large research teams. We examine the problem theoretically and consider the socially optimal scheme for assigning culpability. We consider the simplest possible environment with two scientists, only one of whom is capable of committing fraud. Our theoretical analysis shows that a regime of group accountability that incentivises researchers to monitor other members of the group achieves the best social outcomes. Given this regime, the model yields the counter-intuitive prescription that punishing non-culpable members of the team for participating in a fraudulent project is the most promising tool for increasing the fraction of research that is honest."...
Reciprocity in Peer Assessments.
With Lunzheng Li, Philippos Louis and Dimitrios Xefteris. University of Cyprus Working Paper. Under Review.
Abstract
"Peer assessment’s reliability can be undermined when participants behave strategically. Using a formal model we show how reciprocity can lead to reviewers inflating their rating of each others’ work, which is exacerbated when review takes place sequentially. We conduct a pre-registered online experiment and we find that reviewers engaged in mutual-review relationships inflate their reports more, compared to when reviews are one-sided. For sequential reviews, a non-trivial fraction of first movers maximally over-report. In accordance to our theoretical model, we also find that second movers are responsive to the review they received, but only when reviews are mutual. This reveals the potential for a quid-pro-quo element in mutual reviews. Our results highlight the importance of appropriately structuring peer assessment to take strategic reciprocity motives into account and ensure the system’s reliability."...
